Peter Robinson: Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II, the partnership that changed the world. We're in Washington today at a conference devoted to that subject. With us we have three guests. Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski are foreign policy experts who served in the Reagan White House, and Steven Hayward is perhaps the preeminent historian of the final dramatic years of the Cold War.

Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge. I'm Peter Robinson. A fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, Ambassador Paula Dobriansky has held a number of prominent positions in diplomacy and academia, serving, for example, as the National Security Council's director of European and Soviet affairs during the administration of President George W. Bush. What concerns us today is her service on the National Security Council in the White House of Ronald Reagan.

A resident scholar at the University of California at Berkeley, a fellow at Ashland University, a fellow at the Pacific Research Institute, and a frequent contributor to powerlineblog.com, Dr. Steven Hayward is the author of a number of books, including the magisterial two volume work, *The Age of Reagan*.

The founder and president of the Institute of World Politics, the Graduate School of National Security here in Washington, Dr. John Lenczowski is the author of many works, including his 2011 book, *Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy*. Like Dr. Dobriansky, Dr. Lenczowski served on the National Security Council in the White House of Ronald Reagan.

Ambassador Dobriansky, Dr. Hayward, Dr. Lenczowski, or as I have known you all for 30 years, Paula, Steve, and John, welcome.

Three quotations: President Richard Nixon in May, 1973, "We seek a stable structure. National security must rest upon a certain equilibrium." Quotation two: President Jimmy Carter in 1977, "We've moved to engage the Soviet Union. Our goal is stability, parity, and security." President Ronald Reagan speaking in December 1981 about the crackdown on solidarity to the Polish trade union, "I think there must be an awful lot of people in the iron curtain countries who feel the same way as the people of Poland. We may never get another chance like this in our lifetime."

Now, if this were Sesame Street, you'd say, "Two of these quotations sound like each other, but one doesn't fit." How did Ronald Reagan do that – stand up to the mindset that Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski all held -- and then along comes Reagan? Where did it come from Paula?

Paula D.: Ronald Reagan was a leader. Ronald Reagan came into the White House with a vision. This didn't happen suddenly. He had a purpose, he had a vision, and it was a platform that he also definitively campaigned on and not just only came in place and won the election, but then executed. What's remarkable when you think about it is the consistency of purpose and the way in which, as in Dr.

Lenczowski's book, *Full Spectrum*, there was integrated diplomacy. There was a goal; there was a vision; there was a strategy; and all the elements were tied together in terms of the political elements, the economic components, and public diplomacy absolutely being crucial also to this execution. Then also the military – the military in the sense of defenses and in terms of having, as was the slogan, "peace through strength." So, here you had a president who had a vision, coming in, putting in place all the elements and executing, and it was a real privilege to be part of that team and that execution.

Peter Robinson: John and Steve, I want to ask you to help establish the background. How bad was it? So, as a matter of geostrategy, Soviet client is humiliated, defeated the United States in Vietnam. The Soviets have entrenched themselves in Cuba and Africa, built a deep-water navy, and on and on it goes. This is the background as Ronald Reagan takes office. Now, John, is this something we could have lived with? As a matter of geostrategy, how bad is the situation that Ronald Reagan inherits when he takes the oath of office in January 1981?

John Lenczowski: The Soviet Union in the 1970s was on the march. It was involved in helping to bring about communist takeovers in many countries around the world. You mentioned Indochina, the Soviets were heavily responsible for the North Vietnamese victory in South Vietnam. Their propaganda apparatus around the world was a huge part of it. The North Vietnamese generals declared that the fundamental reason, maybe the decisive reason for their victory was the effectiveness of their propaganda and psychological operations against the United States during that war.

Then you had a pro-communist coup in south Yemen. You had communist takeovers in Mozambique and Angola. You had a near communist takeover in Namibia. You had a communist takeover in Grenada, and another one in Nicaragua. There was Soviet Cuban subversion all over Latin America. Much of this is documented in the Grenada Archive, which nobody studies anymore, but these were the internal documents of the new jewel movement.

When we invaded Grenada, we got a hold of their internal documents which had black on white agreements, Soviet and East German and Cuban military assistance, intelligence agreements, and so on and so forth. There were blueprints for the destruction of the churches in Grenada, which included such things as the promulgation of Liberation Theology on the island and bringing experts on that subject from Cuba and from Nicaragua. We were engaged. We were not only demoralized after Vietnam and divided as a nation, but the soviets perceived us as increasingly weakening, and they were beginning their own massive peace movement. They had hundreds, maybe as many as a thousand, front organizations operating around the world as aid, and that didn't count the active communist parties that were involved. It was a massive global movement that was backed up by their massive military and diplomatic operations, espionage, and active measures, which is disinformation, covert influence operations and so on.

Peter Robinson: Steve, John just mentioned the word demoralized.

Steven Hayward: Right.

Peter Robinson: In this conference, of course we're remembering the old days, but we're also laying down a record. We're talking about events that took place 30 years ago. 30 years from now, we'll all be tottering around or gone. So, it's important to get this stuff down. You teach. What do the kids need to grasp about what the United States felt like – the question of national morale by 1979?

Steven Hayward: Well, I try to tell students these days that in the old days you had to dial a phone, you had to get up to go to the TV because we didn't have remotes.

Peter Robinson: TV, what's a TV?

Steven Hayward: Right, there's a shock. They can't believe this. Inflation – you try and explain the economic circumstances and the demoralization of the country that reaches its apotheosis and the famous malaise speech of President Reagan's predecessor, right? I've actually shown clips of that speech to students, because they can't believe it. It's a whole different world for them.

What I think people need to know, and it bears on the title of our panel, "We May Never Get Another Chance Like This," the whole story of getting to that moment is dramatic; it's moving, it's profound. It testifies to Reagan's greatness as a statesman. I go further than Paula; I say he's a statesman, in the old sense of that word, that I'm trying to bring back. It's archaic, but it means attachment to principle and a profound grasp of the circumstances. We can say more about Reagan's grasp of the circumstances, which was very profound. One of the key elements there, of his many virtues, is his patience. But, there's another sense in which that statement or title is wrong.

I don't mean "wrong" in that it's inaccurate, it's not truthful to the moment, not in any of the revisionist sense that some idiot history professor might try to do. What I mean is it traces back to something else Reagan said early in his political career, back in the '60s, which should stick with us. I remember he said, "We're only one generation away from losing our freedom." We're now a little more than one generation past Reagan, and as you and I were talking recently, socialism is back. How did this happen?

Now, I think, actually John, you put your finger on it recently when I heard you talk, and you mentioned Whittaker Chambers saying, "This is the second oldest faith at the root of all this." Soviet communism may be gone, but the old appeal that "ye shall be as gods" is always going to be with us. What that means is we don't want to leave it just to chance. It's true that a lot of things came together that gave you the pope, President Reagan, and also Margaret Thatcher should be mentioned at some point. What are the odds of that happening? By the way, all three of them survive an assassination attempt.

I'm not normally one to make declarations on theology, but it's hard to dismiss the role of providence in all that. My point is, the reason to study this intensely and keep it alive is because we're going to face more needs for that and hopefully, we can create the same chances.

Peter Robinson: Paula, let me take you a couple of events in the Reagan administration decisions and ask you to tell us what they meant. National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 75, January 17th, 1983, "The United States will contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing with the Soviet Union in all arenas and promote the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced." Well, did that feel as breathtakingly aggressive at the time as it sounds today?

Paula D.: It's interesting the way you asked the question because being in that decision-making process, I will say that, and this may be surprising, but there was actually a kind of unity of purpose here. I felt, even with other agencies – that's not to say there weren't little battles here and there – but there was a unity of purpose. It was breathtaking at the time, but it was something that mobilized us and guided us.

I brought with me the beautiful reflections by Margaret Thatcher on her view on Reagan. One of them relates to what you just asked. She said, "His view that we should fight the battle of ideas for freedom against communism throughout the world, and to accept the permanent exclusion of captive nations from the benefits of freedom." That undergirds NSDD 75.

It's worth saying three points here. The first is, your first question: NSDD 75 underscores the first question. Ronald Reagan was someone who wanted to advance freedom. He wanted to not accept the existence of the captive nations worldwide, no less the Soviet Union, which is what NSDD 75 targets. But he wanted to do something about it and to apply all instruments of policies towards that end. Secondly, which was also significant, it was not just only the actions, but also the words. Ideas mattered, and the ideas that were all put on the table were followed up by policies that had consequences definitively. Then thirdly, to me, being in foreign policy, I think about these directives. I do think about that directive and how that directive has provided a kind of paradigm for many, not only at that time, but even up to this present day.

Recently, some were telling me they look back at that directive and think about how we deal with Iran at this time, interestingly enough. So what the blueprint for action was, was not only relevant and gripping then, but at the same time extremely relevant right up to this present time.

Peter Robinson: John, address from the Oval Office, March 23rd, 1983, "Let me share with you a vision of the future that offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures which are defensive. What if we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?" The Strategic Defense Initiative, or

Star Wars, which the New York Times immediately termed a pipe dream, was there strategic importance?

John Lenczowski: I think it was extremely important. I think that it was one of those material things that the president applied in the various pressures on the Soviet system. Let me just summarize some of the material things, because I think ultimately it wouldn't have happened without the nonmaterial things, which is what this conference is mostly about. But the nonmaterial things did require some kind of a material compliment.

First of all, there was the military buildup. By the way, in quantitative terms, the Reagan military buildup did not even match the Gorbachev military buildup. You should be aware that we had the advantage of high technology and sprint capability. We had the computer revolution in military affairs and so on and so forth, stealth technology, and SDI; the Strategic Defense Initiative, was one of those things. That presented the Soviet Union with the prospect of trumping its potential, either complete or partial first strike capability with their nuclear weapons, their SS-18 force alone.

The military buildup put huge pressure on the Soviet military economy. People talk about a crisis in the Soviet economy, the principal crisis was in the military economy. The crisis in the civilian economy started in 1917, and it was the inability to keep up with us technologically that compelled the Soviets to experiment with different types of reforms, but they never could do reforms. Gorbachev, for example, could never have decentralized his economy even as much as Nikita Khrushchev did. Then of course, when we deprive them of hard currency earnings, particularly in their energy earnings by stimulating the Saudis to increase oil production and to lower the price of energy.

We had a massive technology security program to deprive them of technology. We supported the anticommunist resistance movements in Afghanistan, Central America, and Southern Africa. All of those are the material things, and they were incredibly important. But ultimately, none of those material things explain how a million people can take to the streets of Moscow.

Peter Robinson: This took place in 1990? That's what you're referring to?

John Lenczowski: Yes.

Peter Robinson: Right, okay. Thank you.

John Lenczowski: Right. It doesn't explain how the coal miners in the Kuzbass and the Donbass were going on strike, not for safer working conditions, more wages or better vacations. They were demanding radical political change. None of those material things explain that. What explains it is the nonmilitary strategy that Ronald Reagan brought to bear. Here, back to your very first question, you said,

“Really what's the difference between the Nixon Carter discussion of stability versus Reagan's idea?”

Well, Reagan understood that the Soviets were on the political strategic offensive, and he, instead of engaging in moral equivalence in 19th century balance of power politics, Kissinger style, which assumed that there was no fundamental threat of one side to the other by virtue of our DNA. Remember, George Kennan said, "The Soviets hate us, not for what we do, but for who we are." So, Reagan understood that if they're going to be on the offensive, why should we be on the defensive all the time? We should do reciprocity in all of this. What's the Cold War? It's not hurling guns and rockets. It's the war of ideas. It's the war of two different philosophies of life, two different philosophies of the relationship between men and the state, two different concepts of human rights versus anti human rights. It's that war which Reagan fought, which nobody else fought.

Peter Robinson: Steve Hayward, addressed to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida on March 8th, 1983, "In your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to be where the temptation of pride, the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all, and labeling both sides equally at fault of ignoring the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding, and thereby remove yourselves from the struggle between right and wrong, and good and evil." Now that was over the top, don't you think?

Steven Hayward: No, not a bit.

Peter Robinson: By the way, explain the context. He says, "Your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals." Explain that, the nuclear freeze movement, you'd better just set that.

Steven Hayward: Yeah, so maybe 20, 30 seconds are worth talking about this. It was a religiously based movement, started largely with the Catholics, some of the bishops who were peaceniks, but it spread to Protestants. There were several initiatives on state ballots advisory initiatives calling for a nuclear freeze in 1982 that won. So, this thing had some momentum. I think what really alarmed the White House was when one of the Southern Baptist Conventions, I'm not sure if it's the Southern Baptist Convention, but they adopted the nuclear freeze resolution, and if you're losing Evangelical Protestants in the south, you've got a political problem.

Now, this could be problematic to get too far into this. Unlike Pope John Paul, for lots of reasons that'd take too long to explain, Protestant Christianity, certain parts of it, have often said, "Well, yeah, we're maybe Americans, but our first loyalty is to God." So, your obligations as a citizen may sit on the back burner to one X. This is controversial, and a lot more to discuss than we have time to do today.

On the other hand, these are basically conservative anticommunist people and Reagan wanted to rally them. So, look, the rest of that speech, he quoted C. S. Lewis. He gives a very serious Protestant I think theological explanation of why you can't check out of this, and you certainly can't offer implicit or explicit aid and comfort for the moral equivalency at the root of the nuclear freeze movement. He doesn't directly attack the nuclear freezers for being people of bad motives, which we know they mostly were, but it's implied there. It was very effective, I think.

Peter Robinson: All right. That's the background. He calls the Soviet Union an evil empire and says, "Do not remove yourselves from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil," and you wish to defend those terms.

Steven Hayward: Well, yeah. So, you go back to your first question, you talk about the old equilibrium theory everyone had about the Cold War. Why doesn't Reagan depart from that? He does it for two reasons. By the way, conservatives believe that. I mean, a lot of the neoconservatives thought Soviet communism is a durable form of rule. It's going to be here for 100 years or more. There're various times Norman Podhoretz said, "Sooner or later we're going to have to have a war with these people. It's Athens versus Sparta. We can't resolve this peacefully."

What Reagan thinks is, "No, it's not a durable form of rule. They can make missiles, but they can't make cornflakes." He would say things like this, the Mickey Mouse economy. But beyond that he said it was unnatural. It's an immoral system, and an immoral system cannot survive in the long term. So instinctively, and I think he philosophically rejected the core theory that the establishment went with about this problem. So that's why it's easy for him to say, "It's an evil empire. Let's just call them that."

Peter Robinson: All right.

Paula D.: I have to jump in, may I jump in on that one?

Peter Robinson: Yes.

Paula D.: To me, the result of that was so consequential because he was speaking to the audience definitely in the Soviet Union, in Russia, and also around the globe, and he was speaking to the truth. Margaret Thatcher again said, "One of the strongest weapons deployed by Ronald Reagan was his acknowledgement and upholding of human rights, and the hope that people want."

Peter Robinson: Now, just briefly, I just have to ask you, because you've been talking about the unity behind NSDD 75 and so forth. I just read a speech that got to the president over the objections of his senior staff – like the Westminster address that he delivered in June 1982, like the Berlin Wall address that he delivered in the June of 1987.

Paula D.: I remember that one very well.

Peter Robinson: You remember because you and I were in the trenches on that one.

Paula D.: He [gestures to Peter Robinson] was involved in that speech.

Peter Robinson: So, very senior members of the White House staff and of the foreign policy apparatus objected to all three of those speeches.

John Lenczowski: I didn't.

Peter Robinson: You didn't.

Paula D.: I didn't either.

Peter Robinson: No, but seriously, this is a serious question. How much of a problem for President Reagan, and for those of us who were on his side, so to speak, was what we now call the deep state? How much of a problem?

Paula D.: Well, you asked me though about NSDD 75.

Peter Robinson: Yeah, and there was no problem.

Paula D.: Richard Pipes just passed away recently, and he was integrally involved in that and I was engaged also at the time, and I remember that process. I'm making a distinction to be clear between that process, which was a longer-term process versus a single speech. You are quite right on everything that you've said about the various speeches. There was a battle ground, and I remember in particular yours – the one you worked on for Berlin and tear down that wall – I remember it very distinctly, and even some of our colleagues on the National Security Council staff. We had a fierce debate because some of us were in favor of it, some of us were against it. But the wonderful thing about Ronald Reagan, and that was your first question; see to me, he came in, and he had a vision. He had a purpose. He was absolutely a statesman. I wouldn't quip with you there; but it's not just having that vision, it's implementing it and seeing it through. He took advice, but he went with his passion, his instinct, and what he knew was right.

John Lenczowski: Concerning the deep state, there was a-

Peter Robinson: I don't know if that's the right ...

John Lenczowski: Well, no, but let's say the continuities of-

Peter Robinson: But we know because we lived with it. He was overcoming resistance from within his own operation.

John Lenczowski: From within.

Peter Robinson: Yes.

John Lenczowski: The proper running of government is the forces of continuity versus the forces of change in the bureaucracy or the forces of continuity, and the newly elected officials in their appointees are the forces of change, and it's always a struggle no matter what the government. What had been well ensconced for well over a decade and a half inside the US government, was an understanding of the USSR, that it was a permanent feature of the international political landscape and that it was never going to change. We had therefore to learn to accommodate to this reality and hence all of this equilibrium stuff, this Kissingerian balance of power, policy, and dealing with the symptoms of the tension rather than the causes of the tension.

The causes of the tension were not missiles and rockets and armies, the causes were the DNA of the Soviet system, which was an aggressive expansionist human rights violating system that had to expand in order to demonstrate the veracity of its ideology. The president didn't accept this precisely because he saw the nature of that system as contrary to human nature and having intrinsic vulnerabilities.

Now, our intelligence community was never, throughout that decade and a half, collecting any intelligence on Soviet vulnerabilities. It was not done. As a matter of fact, there was one report that was done on civil unrest in the USSR. That report published, I think, in the mid '80s, 1985 or so, by our intelligence community, but the CIA, even under Bill Casey, wouldn't publish it. Casey would have published it, but the guy who wrote it had to have it published under the moniker of the National Intelligence Council and not the CIA. The only other person who was doing vulnerability studies of the Soviet Union was Herb Meyer, working for Casey. We were collecting no intelligence on the Cold War stuff, the war of information and ideas. Nothing on propaganda or active measures. There was a whole anti-anticommunist attitude within the State Department and the intelligence community.

Peter Robinson: I want to cover two more events. You first Hayward. Reykjavik Summit, October 11th and 12th, 1986. For a day and a half, Gorbachev proposes sweeping cuts in all kinds of weapons, including and especially nuclear weapons, and Ronald Reagan agrees. Then to quote Steve Hayward in the second volume of *The Age of Reagan*, "The unheard of had occurred. The president and General Secretary had just agreed to seek the total abolition of all nuclear weapons." Then near the end of the second day, Gorbachev says, "By the way, there's just one little condition. You have to confine SDI to rather limited laboratory research." Reagan says, "Nothing doing," and the summit ends in, as far as I can tell, reading your account, everybody thinks it was a disaster, at least at first. Why is that such an important point in the Cold War?

Steven Hayward: For several reasons. One of them directly involving him, which I'll get to in a second. First of all, Reagan said early on, I think when he was running for president, he said to one of his children or somebody, said, "What I really want to do is to be able to say 'нет.'"

You have to say no before you can say yes, and this was his great moment to do it. Now he's exhausted;that was an exhausting thing. Second, there's several important moments that have gotten lost in the general narrative, but it shows our far sightedness. Remembering the SDI speech, the next sentences after what you quoted, he said, "Look, this is a long-term project. Might take 20 years to get deployable systems," which turned out to be about right. And when Gorbachev, trying to appeal to him at one point very emotionally, "We'll get rid of our weapons, we'll meet his old man and talk about how we did this, but there's this missile defense thing you want to do." Reagan says, "Look, I'd love to meet you as an old guy. We probably won't remember each other's names," and all this very funny stuff.

But you know, he says, "Even if we do this, there may be a rogue nation," he mentioned Libya, Reagan did, "That will develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, and we'll need to defend against that. Both of us will." Well, guess what? Here we are in the world with North Korea and Iran. So, it shows you again how far sighted Reagan was on so many of these things that tie together.

As I said to John, I was assembling and doing research in the Reagan Library and looking at documents. I found right before Reykjavik in the timeline is a two-page single-space memo from some of the national security staff. I don't remember exactly; this is 15 years ago that I read it, John. But it said, "What's Gorbachev up to with the snap meeting?" He says, "I think he's going to go after SDI, and maybe some other things, and we'll want to-"

Peter Robinson: Did you write that (referring to John Lenczowski)?

Steven Hayward: He did. He says, "We'll want to smoke him out early if we can." You remember this memo? You probably wrote a lot of memos; I don't know. But you absolutely nailed it.

John Lenczowski: Well, I was skeptical of pageant-like summitry, because summitry was always a battle field that benefited the Soviets. And it always benefits the bad guys. I think summitry is one of the most dangerous things American presidents can do.

Peter Robinson: Am I correct though… fair summary of what happened at Reykjavik is that Gorbachev makes one run at Reagan's effort to bring to bear economic dynamism and technical dynamism on this race between us and the Soviets, and reconfine it to a kind of conventional balance. And Reagan says, "No way." At that moment it's over. They cannot compete. Is that correct? It's a decisive moment in that sense.

Paula D.: It was a very decisive moment, and it's worth going back to again when he made the announcement by the way about SDI, and as it was called Star Wars at the time. It's worth noting, if you were reading the Reagan Library literature and memos, and if one goes and looks at what was coming out of Moscow at the time, and a number of these things have been declassified, actually, this was one of the most threatening militarily developments.

So, it's not a surprise that Gorbachev did what he did because when you look at the materials years later, you see that that actual announcement and development. When Reagan announced SDI, it then no less led up to Reykjavik, and then beyond. This was singled out as one of the most threatening military developments.

Steven Hayward: One quick footnote on the Reykjavik story: Reagan liked to argue about ideas, and there's a moment in the Soviet transcript that was actually more complete than the State Department transcript. In the Soviet transcript it reads wonderfully. There's Reagan saying, "You communists, you've always declared moral revolution and Marxism and single party rule. You've got a multiparty rule." In exasperation, Gorbachev turns to George Shelton and says, "There he goes again, quoting all these phony Lennon quotations that aren't true."

Then Reagan says, "But look, Mr. Secretary, every Soviet leader from Lennon on down has said," the orthodoxy, and then Reagan says, "You haven't said it; maybe you don't believe it. I noticed that you don't say it," and I'm reading this thinking to myself, "That was the moment when you almost could have declared the Cold War was over and Gorbachev missed it." He didn't respond. He changed the subject one, "Let's get back to talking about missile numbers." But there's Reagan saying, "Take seriously what people say," and noticing that Gorbachev was different.

Now, by the way, my summary of Gorbachev was that he wasn't Machiavelli. He was Inspector Clouseau. That's my shorthand for him. He was probably right about everything, but he missed the chance. But there was Reagan, saying that. I thought it was fascinating to see. Again, that scenario got lost in most accounts of it.

Peter Robinson: So, the pope visits Poland in 1979 for all eight years of the Reagan administration. There is, as we have heard, coordination at a minimum between the White House and the Vatican. And in 1990 Lech Wałęsa takes office as President of the Democratic Poland. What is the role that Poland played in the end of the Cold War? John?

John Lenczowski: Can I answer this in the context of sort of the way this panel was described, which is the grand strategy issue?

Peter Robinson: Sure.

John Lenczowski: Ronald Reagan had a grand strategy, and it was to harness all of the different instruments of power, as Paula eloquently described, in order to compete in the Cold War. The Cold War was not simply aircrafts intercepting each other over the Bering Straits or the North Atlantic, submarines chasing each other. The Cold War was a war of ideas, philosophies of life, and so on. As Paula said, central to it was presidential rhetoric. The president told the truth. He told the truth. He said truths about the nature of the Soviet system, which all of his predecessors, except maybe going back to John F. Kennedy, censored themselves. And if you were a dissident in Poland, or languishing somewhere in the Gulag in the Soviet Union, what do you think when American presidents are censoring themselves and are playing kissy face with their oppressors, which is what President Carter was doing? You say, "Well, Moscow is so powerful that even the Americans have to go along with the politically correct party line, that this is a legitimate regime, and that there's nothing objectionable about it."

So, Ronald Reagan broke that self-censorship. And when he said “evil empire,” as Anatoly Sharansky, (now Natan Sharansky in the Israeli Knesset) said, his words reverberated in the dankest corridors of the Gulag, and gave them hope that finally here's somebody who has the courage to bear moral witness. Then there have to be the force multipliers of all of this. Reagan in his Westminster speech, instead of simply being anticommunist, he was offering a positive alternative: human rights, democracy, legitimate government. This is the vision that we would like to see. Not simply that we think this thing is bad, of course we think it's bad!

Then Alexander Solzhenitsyn meanwhile is saying, as Ed Meese said, on Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, he described those as the most powerful weapon we possessed in the Cold War. Scratch your favorite foreign policy expert in Washington, D.C. and ask him for an explanation of what Solzhenitsyn was talking about. You will not get an intellectually satisfying answer. The answer is that those radios not only broadcast the truth in terms of news, gave them religious programming when they were denied religion, gave them alternative ideas, which they were denied, but they also served as a vehicle to break the atomization of society, to enable people to communicate with each other.

Whenever there's a civil disturbance in the communist world, what do the Communists do? They cut off all communications to that place, and then they go crush the civil disturbance. And if the news gets out to the population that there was a civil disturbance, a strike, a riot, and it was crushed, well it's okay. It was crushed. Resistance is futile. So, then what happened?

We were getting a good signal into Poland, and there was a strike in the linen shipyards. Well, the strikers knew that if they could develop an underground line of communication to Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America, the very fact of the strike could be broadcast to tens of millions of people in real time, before the thing is crushed. That's when, in solidarity with those strikers, practically the entire adult population of Poland rises up and joins

the solidarity union overnight. Combine that with the moral witness of the pope and the courage that he gave everybody in Poland, you had this conflagration now within the middle of the Soviet Empire.

Paula D.: Let me start with Poland, but I want to make a comment about grand strategy, because of the component of public diplomacy and ideas. Poland was pivotal. I think people will remember when I say this. When Ronald Reagan saw that you had the Soviet troops at the border, this is in 1981, when Reagan came in, and martial law had been imposed. Remember that Charles Wick was the head of the USIA. Remember that also Charles Wick was a cabinet member as a member of USIA. Why that matters: public diplomacy was integrated as policy was being developed, not after the fact. Do you remember the simple phrase, “let Poland be Poland?” “Light a candle in every window.” I remember this. The simple excerpts from Reagan's statement, "Light a candle. Everyone, light a candle in the window. Let Poland be Poland." Very simple phrase, but it motivated people. It uplifted people. It brought them together in Poland. It was a force. It was a movement, and they felt connected.

The church was absolutely, in this context, connected – everything from the conscience and the spirit and the words of Pope John Paul II, but also right down to the actual dissemination of aid that was smuggled into Poland. Father Popiełuszko, who's very well remembered, of the Catholic Church died. He put his life on the line. He was beaten to death because of his involvement in supporting solidarity. So, there was a movement, and Poland was crucial.

Poland was crucial because of that confluence of all of these elements of the political support and leadership from the United States. The support also came from and throughout Europe at the time, no less in terms of the church and the movement on the ground. Let me say one last thing on grand strategy, because I think it's important. Public diplomacy really was significant, and the importance of ideas, the importance of a grand strategy, was that there was a goal and a target that literally tied together the speeches, tied together what President Reagan advanced as NSDDs. There was not only 75, but there was 77, which was about public diplomacy itself, about using the radios, about using these instruments that John had described before. Also, significantly, I'd even add, because I don't know that this has continued, but even on the NSC staff of which I served on, as did John, you had an individual in the unit of public diplomacy unit.

Our colleague and friend, who's deceased, Walt Raymond, but there were others. John very engaged in it, I engaged in it. That was an important part of state craft here. As a statesman, he knew and understood that it's not just only the political relationships, the economic, the military, but it is about a grand strategy, weaving these together, and making sure that your policies not only are well understood by your audiences, but they do provide that inspiration and that hope.

Peter Robinson: I'm just so conscious that we're describing events to the students in your classroom, and I'm not talking about sixth graders, I'm talking about your college students. John and Paula and I might as well have served for Ulysses S. Grant. So, how do you sum it up? What do you tell them they need to grasp about the grand strategy of Ronald Reagan? You get the last word.

Steven Hayward: Oh, my goodness. That's really very difficult to do. I do emphasize the ability of the statesman to understand the circumstances deeply and then have the judgment to know what to do and all the virtues required for that. In this particular case, since the theme of our conference, as great as the grand strategy was, I'm not sure it would have succeeded without the pope, Pope John Paul II.

My recollection as a 20-year-old student was reading *TIME* and *Newsweek* on that visit to Poland the pope made. There were these couple of details which stuck with me forever. One was Soviet troops were confined to base in Poland. Second, *TIME* and *Newsweek*, I forget which one, maybe both said, "the civil government essentially had ceased to function during the pope's five days there," and I remember thinking as a 20-year-old, "These people are in trouble."

My refined judgment now that I'm older, having thought about it and looking back in hindsight, is what did the pope do? He didn't call for a revolt. That would have been Hungary '56, only worse. Instead, he turned the hourglass upside-down and started the sand running out on that form of rule. Reagan could help, but I think he could not have done it without that happening.

Peter Robinson: Well let me flip the question. Could the pope have done it without the United States, without Ronald Reagan?

Steven Hayward: Well, now there is a very big question, what actually did pass? I think that the Reagan, Casey, Bill Clark, thought of the Vatican not as an active intelligence and a subversion unit, but as a better source of intelligence and insight into what was going on.

Paula D.: I don't know how many people know this, but at the same time that Reagan advanced with "Let Poland be Poland," the pope, in 1981, sent a private note to Brezhnev about the troops that were amassed on the border, and made an appeal. His moral uplifting, his involvement, his engagement, I believe was vital.

John Lenczowski: Two little tidbits that are part of this collaboration, that have not yet been mentioned in this conference: There were regular briefings by CIA director Bill Casey and his deputy, General Vernon Walters, and they would come regularly to the Vatican and brief the Holy Father about the nuclear balance in Europe. The Soviets had been engaged in a huge anti-INF deployment campaign to prevent us from balancing their intermediate range nuclear forces with our own. The Europeans had invited us to do this because of the obsolescence of our own forces there, but the Soviet campaign was so great that they had

managed to disinform large numbers of Europeans thinking that this was an American initiative to nuclearize and make a nuclear battlefield out of the European continent.

As a result of those briefings, which were a lot about Soviet INF deployments, the Holy Father did not object to American nuclear deployments. Normally, you think, "All of the men of the cloth are just wanting to beat the swords into plow shares," and you would have expected the Vatican bureaucracy to oppose this. But the Holy Father, having gotten these briefings, did not do so. And we could go ahead and do that with confidence.

Another tidbit: Bill Casey once called up the chairman of our board, Owen Smith, at the Institute of World Politics, who was also his son-in-law and former business partner. Owen said, "Bill, you know those Gestetner mimeograph machines?"

"Yeah. What do you want me to do?"

He said, "Go buy 50 of them."

"Okay. Now what do you want me to do with them?"

"Send them to the Vatican."

Well, Lech Wałęsa came to the Institute of World Politics to give a lecture, and Owen went up to him afterwards and asked, "President Wałęsa, you know anything about some mimeograph machines?"

He said, "We picked them up at St. Brigida's Church."